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ABSTRACT 
For technology ventures (and also other firms), R&D alliances provide great learning 
opportunities and access to scarce resources. However, R&D alliances, in particular between 
competitors, also involve the concomitant threat of opportunistic behavior, which many firms 
attempt to manage by formalizing the partnership. Yet, prior research provided mixed 
findings suggesting that formalization alleviates opportunism, fails to do so, or, ironically, 
even promotes it. The questions of whether and, if so, when formalization can deter 
opportunism remains topical. This study differentiates two forms of opportunistic behavior, 
strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation, and examines how they are affected by 
formalization, per se and in combination with communication quality. Findings from 82 R&D 
alliances between competitors indicate that extensive formalization promotes opportunistic 
behavior. In contrast, communication quality mitigates the dysfunctional effect on strategic 
manipulation and also alleviates both forms of opportunism directly. Most effects vary with 
the type of opportunistic behavior.  
 
Our findings add to the literature by demonstrating a positive formalization-opportunism 
relationship in the context of R&D alliances and by suggesting that relational governance 




(formalization), rather than both having complementary relationships. The results also support 
the call for more research into nuances of opportunism: they show that differentiating forms 
of opportunism matters for understanding the efficacy of safeguards against opportunism. 
Managers are warned against over-formalizing alliances, which spurs opportunism. Instead, 
they should cultivate an atmosphere of open communication, while they can still maintain 
some ‘healthy distrust’. This attenuates the adverse effects of formalization, which is 
important since a certain level of formalization is often inevitable in R&D alliances. 
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Access to resources (van de Vrande et al., 2011) and access to technology-based and 
market-based learning (Afuah, 2000) are just two examples of what may motivate technology 
ventures to seek R&D alliances with competing incumbents (Gnyawali et al., 2006). Yet such 
alliances saliently incur a risk of opportunistic behavior (Dickson et al., 2006; Hamel, 1991; 
Singh and Mitchell, 1996). In the worst case, the incumbent appropriates core technologies, 
putting the venture’s long-term survival at stake (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). Inhibiting 
opportunism, therefore, becomes a key concern for any venture interested in conducting joint 
R&D with a competing firm. One solution transaction cost economists (Williamson, 1985) 
and agency theorists (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) have proposed involves 
formalization, i.e. codifying desired outputs and/or behaviors and documenting these in the 
form of contracts, rules and procedures (cf. Vlaar et al., 2007a).
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 However, prior research has 
yielded mixed findings showing that formalization effectively suppresses opportunism in 
interfirm exchanges (Judge and Dooley, 2006; Luo, 2007a), that it fails to do so (Deeds and 
Hill, 1999; Lui et al., 2009), or that formalization, ironically, promotes opportunism (Heide et 
al., 2007; Ju et al., 2011; Provan and Skinner, 1989). Thus, the questions of whether and, if 
so, when formalization can deter opportunism in R&D alliances remain topical.  
In an attempt to address these questions, this study draws on prior work exploring 
opportunism in interfirm alliances. First, previous studies have demonstrated the destructive 
impact of partner opportunism—and even of the perception of opportunism—on alliance 
outcomes (Judge and Dooley, 2006; Lui et al., 2009; Luo, 2007b; Parkhe, 1993) and have 
tested deterrents against opportunism (e.g., Deeds and Hill, 1999). While these studies drew 
on broad measures of opportunism, Wathne and Heide (2000:37) have called to differentiate 
forms of opportunism: “[…] if nuances among forms of opportunism are unclear, deploying 
strategies for suppressing opportunistic behavior becomes problematic.” More research along 




Jap et al., 2013; Lumineau and Quélin, 2012; Walter et al., 2010). Second, a small, but 
growing stream of literature has examined the formalization-opportunism link for general 
alliances (e.g., Judge and Dooley, 2006, Luo, 2007a). However, contradictory findings 
indicate that this relationship is, to date, not well-understood, in particular for the specific case 
of R&D alliances (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012). Finally, there is a long-
standing debate in the alliance literature on whether formal and relational governance 
complement (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002) or substitute (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998) one 
another in shaping alliance performance. Relatively little is known on their interactive or 
substitutive effect on partner opportunism. 
This study helps filling above gaps by developing a more nuanced understanding of 
opportunism and by exploring the role of formalization, per se and in interaction with 
relational governance in terms of communication quality. The article starts with 
differentiating two forms of opportunistic behavior salient in R&D alliances: strategic 
manipulation, i.e. one partner influences their counterpart’s strategic orientation to pursue 
individual gains at the counterpart’s expense, and knowledge appropriation, i.e. internalizing 
a partner’s knowledge without their agreements in ways that are counter to the firm’s strategic 
interests (Doz, 1987; Katila et al., 2008). The article then builds on the literature on 
coordination, cooperation, and sensemaking (e.g. Gulati et al., 2005; Gulati et al., 2012; Vlaar 
et al., 2006) to argue that high levels of formalization increase opportunistic behavior 
perceived by technology ventures (our focal firms). Moreover, communication quality—the 
extent to which the partners exchange meaningful and timely information in an open and 
honest manner (cf. Anderson and Narus, 1990; Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000)—is introduced as 
an important  influence that mitigates perceived opportunistic behavior and the dysfunctions 
of formalization. Finally, it is suggested that the direct and interactive effects of formalization 




The study adopts the perspective of a focal firm, a technology venture in a dyadic 
exchange with a competing incumbent, where the venture reports on its own position, on the 
circumstances of the partnership, and on the counterpart’s behavior. In this under-researched 
but important context (Afuah, 2000; Gnyawali et al., 2006; Katila et al., 2008), the tension 
between cooperation and competition resides not only in the alliance, but also in the market 
(Gnyawali et al., 2006). Risks of opportunism and the vulnerability of technology ventures 
tend to be high in such alliances (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). Data from 82 R&D alliances 
between technology ventures and established competitors supports many of our arguments. 
Overall, our study extends the literature on multiple fronts. First, it demonstrates 
dysfunctional effects of formalization in the context of R&D alliances. Second, it introduces 
communication quality as an important relational influence that directly suppresses 
opportunism and compensates for the dysfunctions of formalization. Third, it provides a 
nuanced view on opportunism and demonstrates that both the dysfunctional effect of 




Opportunism in R&D alliances  
Since Williamson’s (1975:6) original, broad definition of opportunism as “self-interest 
seeking with guile”, theorizing about opportunism has increasingly become more nuanced.2 
Williamson himself (1985:47) made a start by specifying the term “guile” as “calculated 
efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”. He also distinguished 
between ex-ante opportunism, including various forms of deliberate misrepresentation during 
alliance initiation, and ex-post opportunism, including various forms of violations over the 
course of the alliance. Other scholars have suggested that opportunism in strategic alliances 




breaching contracts, overstating capabilities, or holding up the partner (Dickson et al., 2006; 
Hamel, 1991; Luo, 2007a). Similarly, Das (2005:707) has pointed to the variety of 
opportunistic behavior, including for instance “withholding or distorting information and 
shirking or failing to fulfill promises or obligations”. Despite attempts to theoretically 
differentiate specific forms of opportunistic behavior, empirical studies on alliances have 
predominantly focused on general forms of opportunism (e.g., Judge and Dooley, 2006; Luo, 
2007b; Parkhe, 1993; Provan and Skinner, 1989). More research into nuances of opportunistic 
behavior is important to better understand the opportunism phenomenon and the efficacy of 
various suppression strategies (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  
Das and Kumar (2011) and Lumineau and Quélin (2012) made a promising start by 
illuminating the manner in which alliance partners behave opportunistically. They drew on 
Wathne and Heide’s (2000) categorization of active and passive opportunism, having its 
theoretical roots in transaction cost economics and relational contracting theory. Passive 
opportunism occurs when a partner refrains from particular actions. Examples include 
shirking, evasion of obligations, inflexibility or refusal to adapt to new circumstances. Active 
opportunism occurs when a partner engages in particular actions, such as engaging in 
explicitly or implicitly prohibited behaviors or using changed circumstances to extract 
concessions from the other partner. Since this type of opportunism may often be salient, we 
focus on the active category. In particular, two facets of active opportunism are suggested 
based on the extant literature. The first is strategic manipulation, this is according to our 
definition one partner influencing their counterpart’s strategic orientation in order to advance 
their own interest at their counterpart’s expense. The risk that partner pursue own, strategic 
interests is particularly high in alliances between (potential) rivals (Baum et al., 2000). To 
give an example: in 2000 Net2Phone and Cisco formed an R&D alliance to make their 
products more compatible and marketable. Later, Net2Phone accused its former partner of 




further development in order to advance its own competing products. To illustrate the severity 
of the consequences, experts have estimated that Net2Phone could have sought as much as 
$700 million in total damages, even as its market capitalization was $316 million (Wall Street 
Journal, 2002). Similarly, findings of Sarkar et al. (2001) suggest that firms sometimes 
hamper alliance partners’ achievement of strategic learning objectives purposefully. 
The second type of opportunistic behavior is knowledge appropriation which occurs 
when a firm internalizes a partner’s knowledge without their agreements in ways that are 
counter to the latter’s strategic interests (Doz, 1987; Katila et al., 2008). The literature on 
knowledge-based alliances suggests unintended knowledge transfer as a key concern among 
partners (e.g., Katila et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Sampson, 2007). 
Appropriating a partner’s knowledge can be viewed as one form of opportunistic behavior 
(Emden et al., 2006) that is a serious threat for small entrants engaging in R&D alliances with 
larger incumbents (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Baum et al., 2000). R&D collaborations are 
typically susceptible to open, unrestricted knowledge sharing often observed by engineers at 
the operative level. Seemingly insignificant technical details such as the size of a socket in a 
laboratory can reveal critical information about one partner’s ongoing research projects to the 
other. One example of knowledge appropriation is the R&D collaboration between Sendo and 
Microsoft to develop the first phone using a mobile version of the Windows operating system. 
Sendo later sued their partner for having stolen key technology and passing it to HTC to 
produce a Windows-based phone at low costs (Business Week, 2003). A second example is 
the development of the Apple Macintosh in the 1980s (Li et al., 2008). While developing 
applications for Apple, Microsoft gained access to critical knowledge about Apple’s 
Graphical User Interface. This enabled Microsoft to create Windows and to enter the market 
for operating systems. 
The literature proposes several mechanisms for discouraging opportunism among 




2002), establishing safeguarding mechanisms especially in the formative stage may be critical 
for vulnerable, resource-starved technology ventures such as our focal firms. Such 
mechanisms may for instance include selecting partners with low opportunistic propensity 
(Wathne and Heide, 2000), making mutual, idiosyncratic investments (Heide and John, 1988) 
and aligning partner goals (Jap and Anderson, 2003). One measure that has received special 
attention in the literature, however (and one that has produced paradoxical empirical findings) 
is formalization (e.g., Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Hawkins et al., 2008; Vlaar et al., 2006). 
Scholars have discussed various, partly intertwined functions of formalization in interfirm 
relationships: it helps guide and monitor partner behavior (control function; e.g. Carson et al., 
2006; Williamson, 1985) and align partner activities (coordination function; e.g. Gulati et al., 
2005; Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011), and it fosters mutual understanding among partners 
(sensemaking function; e.g., Vlaar et al., 2006). Against this backdrop, the subsections below 
argue why formalization should increase perceived opportunistic behavior in terms of 
strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation and why communication quality should 
mitigate this effect. 
  
Formalization and perceived opportunistic behavior 
Some formalization may be required in R&D alliances—in particular between 
competitors (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Larson, 1992)—and is widely regarded as beneficial 
(Judge and Dooley, 2006; Luo, 2007a; Oxley, 1997). However, a small, but growing stream in 
the alliance literature has questioned the safeguarding efficacy of formalization (e.g., Provan 
and Skinner, 1989; Vlaar et al., 2007a) because extensive formalization consumes 
considerable resources and results in agreements that are often (and inevitably) incomplete 
and not fully enforceable (Dickson et al., 2006; Williamson, 1985). Against this backdrop, we 
now argue that high levels of formalization are positively rather than negatively related with 




does not produce more opportunistic behavior per se, but simply increases the partners’ 
chances of detecting such behavior. In other words, formalization may increase a firm’s 
sensitivity to partner opportunism (real or suspected) without affecting its frequency. 
However, there are arguments beyond this simple notion. 
First, extensive formalization can induce a failure of its control function by impairing 
partner motivation to collaborate. Jap and Ganesan (2000), for instance, found explicit 
contracts to have a negative impact on partner commitment. Also findings by Falk and 
Kosfeld (2006) suggest that a principal’s controlling decision reduces the agent’s 
performance, who perceives this as a limitation of choice autonomy and signal of distrust. 
Formalization can thus hamper one or both partners’ intrinsic motivation and commitment to 
an alliance and thereby lead them to pursue selfish rather than common goals. Moreover, 
according to Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan (2007), enhanced monitoring of partner behavior, 
one of the key benefits of formalization, can, ironically, result in ‘reactance types of effects’: 
it can lead to attitudes and behaviors that the counterpart can easily interpret as being 
defensive in nature and as such indicative of opportunism. For instance, if a technology 
venture insists on detailed work plans with tight deadlines, engineers of the incumbent can 
perceive this as an obtrusive form of control, leading them to ignore the request. This, in turn, 
can lead the venture to suspect opportunism. Indeed, studies have demonstrated a positive link 
between surveillance and opportunistic behavior (Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Hawkins et 
al., 2008; Provan and Skinner, 1989). Similarly, Schweitzer et al. (2004) have found that goal 
setting, one important aspect of formalization, has the unintended consequence of motivating 
unethical behavior, such as overstatement or false claiming of accomplishments, when 
partners fall short of reaching their goals.  
Second, a partner is more likely to misinterpret the counterpart’s behavior in highly 
formalized alliances—a failure of the sensemaking function of formalization. Since 




extensive formalization are likely to be more suspicious and to regard a particular action on 
the part of their partner as opportunistic, whereas more optimistic firms would not be so 
suspicious (Das and Rahman, 2002). Formalization not only increases perceptions of social 
distance and signals distrust (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), but it can also create mechanistic 
management practices allowing little room for adaptation (Blatt, 2009). If circumstances 
change, a firm pressing for a modification may interpret a partner’s insistence on the original 
arrangement as counterproductive or selfish behavior (Wathne and Heide, 2000). Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the formalization, the higher the opportunistic behavior (in 
terms of strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation) perceived by the 
technology venture. 
 
Communication quality and perceived opportunistic behavior 
Relational governance has long been suggested as an alternative to formalization that 
overcomes the inevitable incompleteness of formal arrangements (Macneil, 1980; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998). It provides a flexible and cost-efficient mechanism as alliances evolve over time 
(Doz, 1996) and environmental changes occur (Luo, 2007b).
3
 It also promotes the 
development of trust among the alliance partners (Gulati, 1998). Prior research on relational 
governance has revolved around the concepts of trust (e.g.,  Das and Teng, 1996, 1998, 2001, 
Lui and Ngo, 2004) and of more general relational norms (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
However, alliance scholars increasingly consider communication an important means to 
achieve cooperation and coordination in alliances (Agarwal et al., 2010; Mohr and Spekman, 
1994; Zeng and Chen, 2003). A climate of open communication emerges in some, but not all 
alliances (Doz, 1996). We now suggest that communication quality is negatively related to 




Collaborative research requires the partners to continuously provide one another with 
detailed information. Open communication promotes a continuous flow of information 
between the parties (Kogut, 2000; Larson, 1992) and also enables legitimate interfirm 
learning and goal adjustment (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). Communication evokes partner 
support (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) and signals commitment to and interest in a lasting 
collaboration (Gundlach et al., 1995). Communication reduces coordination costs and 
promotes cooperation through moral suasion, development of group identity, and trust 
(Agarwal et al., 2010; Zeng and Chen, 2003). Consequently, communication quality increases 
an alliance’s potential value, which motivates the partners to seek long-term, mutual benefits 
rather than immediate, unilateral benefits through opportunistic behavior. 
Moreover, since communication quality requires mutual investments by the partners and 
takes time to develop, it can serve as additional safeguard. If unforeseen events render the 
initial structural design obsolete, communication quality can deter partner misconduct and 
stabilize the partnership. Formalization cannot possibly stipulate every potential contingency, 
as managers are constrained in their ability to anticipate the future (Macneil, 1980). 
Unexpected disturbances can impair the efficacy of existing structural safeguards (Ariño et 
al., 2008) and destabilize an ongoing partnership (Williamson, 1975). In this situation, open 
communication sustains inter-partner trust (Gulati, 1998), reassures both partners that each 
will act in good faith (Das and Teng, 2001) and will not opportunistically exploit the absence 
of other safeguards. In this way, communication can prevent a dangerous sequence of 
opportunistic action and reaction between partners. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the communication quality, the lower the opportunistic 
behavior (in terms of strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation) perceived 





The interplay of formalization and communication quality 
The academic debate on whether formal and relational governance complement (e.g., 
Faems et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010; Lui and Ngo, 2004; Mellewigt et al., 2007; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Ryall and Sampson, 2009), substitute for (e.g., Carson et al., 2006; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Granovetter, 1985), or impair one another (e.g., Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) has 
not waned. Our study adds to this line of work by suggesting that, regardless of whether it 
emerged prior to or during an ongoing partnership, communication quality alleviates the 
effect of extensive formalization on opportunistic behavior for two reasons. First, 
communication quality compensates for the demotivating effects of formalization. It has been 
long suggested that relational concerns can mitigate the tendency to act opportunistically 
(Coase, 1988: 44). Communication reinforces relational concerns by evoking partner support 
(Mohr and Spekman, 1994) and by signaling commitment to a long-term cooperation 
(Gundlach et al., 1995). Similarly, Jap et al. (2013) have proposed that in a relationship 
characterized by sympathy, accord, and cooperation (“rapport”) the moral costs of 
misbehavior increase and thereby inhibit opportunism. Also Heide et al. (2007) found that 
relational elements, in terms of micro-level social contracts, buffer the dysfunctional effects 
of behavior monitoring. Second, communication quality mitigates the risk of serious 
misunderstandings that may arise from the use of formalization. In general, the difficulty of 
correctly interpreting partner behavior can lead to suspicion, and suspicion to distrust 
(Agarwal et al., 2010). The request by one partner to establish extensive structural safeguards 
can easily be misconstrued by the other as a sign of distrust. Another misunderstanding can 
occur if one firm, failing to meet a requirement defined in interfirm agreements, is suspected 
by the other side, by reason of this failure, of having acted opportunistically. If 
communication quality is too low to clarify the situation, retaliatory behavior is a likely 
consequence (Gundlach et al., 1995), and the partnership might degenerate into a vicious 




the partners may clarify the situation and re-establish a climate of cooperative behavior (Zeng 
and Chen, 2003). Communication reduces the risk of a ‘pre-emptive strike’ based on 
misunderstanding by promoting mutual understanding between the partners (Stephen and 
Coote, 2007). Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 3: Communication quality decreases the positive relationship between 
formalization and opportunistic behavior (in terms of strategic manipulation and 
knowledge appropriation) perceived by the technology venture. 
 
Differences between strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation 
The preceding sections did not differentiate forms of opportunistic behavior. We now 
argue why the effect strengths of formalization and communication quality, per se and in 
interaction, should differ for strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation. The 
differential effects may be caused by two mechanisms. First, since both types of opportunistic 
behavior vary in terms of intentionality, severity and mutuality, they vary in the likelihood to 
be tolerated by a victim and in their potential costs. Strategic manipulation is intentional and 
connotes overtly unethical behavior. It is often long-planned and tends to have drastic 
consequences for the victim, as exemplified by the Net2Phone-Cisco case (Wall Street 
Journal, 2002). The offender clearly focuses on maximizing individual benefits at partner 
costs. Since a direct remedy for such a severe misconduct seems difficult, strategic 
manipulation is likely to be a ‘deal-breaker’ that, if detected, results in an early termination of 
the alliance. Thus, it seems plausible to assume that strategic manipulation typically 
represents high-stakes opportunism (Jap et al., 2013). In contrast, knowledge appropriation 
can take the form of intentional and overt attempts to outlearn the partner (Hamel, 1991), but 
can also be understood as originating in unintentional spillovers of knowledge that occur 




partners exchange information freely. R&D alliances are conducive to such spillovers because 
finding the right balance of knowledge sharing and protection is difficult (Oxley and 
Sampson, 2004). A victim of knowledge appropriation may often be compensated by own 
learning, either through bilateral spillovers or own attempts to internalize partner knowledge 
(Hamel, 1991). While the consequences of knowledge appropriation for the alliance may 
depend on perceptions of its intentionality and severity, we assume knowledge appropriation, 
given that it may often be unintentional and/or mutual, predominantly represents low-stakes 
opportunism (Jap et al., 2013). Second, partnerships characterized by harmony and mutual 
understanding are conducive to mild forms of opportunism but not strong forms. In such 
partnerships, the opportunistic party tends to engage in morally malleable reasoning to justify 
mild opportunistic behavior (Jap et al., 2013). 
Beyond this backdrop, we now suggest that the positive link between formalization and 
opportunistic behavior (Hypothesis 1) is stronger for knowledge appropriation than for 
strategic manipulation. As argued above, formalization can reduce commitment or evoke 
reactance, leading the partners to take actions to improve their condition (Provan and Skinner, 
1989). This stimulus to opportunistic behavior tends to result in knowledge appropriation 
rather than strategic manipulation because formalization propels interfirm learning (Vlaar et 
al., 2007a) and facilitates the acquisition of difficult to protect tacit knowledge (Liebeskind, 
1996), for instance by defining interfaces for knowledge exchange (Puranam and Jacobides, 
2006) and by connecting key knowledge holders across firm boundaries. Moreover, while 
formalization can increase the perception of suspicious behavior in general (Vlaar et al., 
2007a), a partner is more likely to suspect (or misperceive) knowledge appropriation than 
strategic manipulation. This is because interfirm learning, legitimate or illegitimate, is often 
mutual (Hamel, 1991) and mutuality makes opportunism more easily justified (Jap et al., 




detection may disrupt the alliance and entails substantial reputational costs for the 
opportunistic partner. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The positive effect of formalization is stronger for knowledge 
appropriation than for strategic manipulation. 
 
Hypothesis 2 postulated that communication quality deters opportunistic behavior. We 
now argue that this effect is stronger for strategic manipulation than for knowledge 
appropriation. Communication quality mitigates opportunism by creating a supportive and 
trust-based climate in the alliance which raises the pay-off from collaborative vis-à-vis selfish 
behavior. While many alliance partners may take precautions to maintain the good 
relationship, open communication also promotes intentional or unintentional knowledge 
flows, thereby creating a higher potential for knowledge appropriation. A climate of open 
communication can mislead in particular employees at the operative level to share proprietary 
information and justify the sharing on grounds of mutuality and familiarity. For instance, 
Czepiel (1974) found that informal communication drives the diffusion of innovation among 
firms. Moreover, communication quality requires reciprocal investments by the partners and 
thus serves as a safeguard against opportunism. A victim is likely to consider the value of 
their investments when deciding about an appropriate response to opportunistic behavior. 
Such a cost-benefit rationale may lead many partners to tolerate mild forms of opportunism 
(Wathne and Heide, 2000). In contrast to strategic manipulation, knowledge appropriation is 
easier to justify as being unintentional, less severe and/or mutual, making it more likely to be 
tolerated. Some partners may anticipate the tolerance limit and engage in knowledge 





Hypothesis 4b: The negative effect of communication quality is stronger for strategic 
manipulation than for knowledge appropriation. 
 
Finally, we suggest that communication quality is more likely to remedy the 
dysfunctional effect of formalization on strategic manipulation than on knowledge 
appropriation (cf. Hypothesis 3). Open communication can shape relationships characterized 
by interpersonal harmony and mutual understanding (Zeng and Chen, 2003). Jap et al. (2013: 
218) label such relationships “rapport” and suggest that they are conducive to morally 
malleable reasoning where alliance partners justify opportunistic behavior by arguing, for 
instance, that “an opportunistic act is not so bad, that the person taken advantage of would 
not mind, or that the transaction partner likely already knows and implicitly approves of this 
activity”. In high rapport settings, the partners tend to view mild forms of opportunism (“low-
stakes opportunism”) as being victimless and normal, whereas high-stakes opportunism 
would be difficult to justify. Indeed, Jap et al. (2013) observed stronger opportunistic 
tendencies, when the stakes were low and rapport high, and explained this by an increase in 
malleable reasoning. Communication quality is a concept related to rapport. Knowledge 
appropriation can be regarded as a form of low-stakes opportunism and strategic manipulation 
as high-stakes opportunism. It is therefore suggested that knowledge appropriation as opposed 
to strategic manipulation is more likely in alliances high in communication quality. While 
communication quality may still mitigate dysfunctions of formalization, the above mechanism 
creates a countervailing effect for knowledge appropriation. The mitigating effect formulated 
in Hypothesis 3 is thus expected to be stronger for strategic manipulation. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 4c: The moderating effect of communication quality is stronger for strategic 






R&D coopetitions as research context 
Alliances between direct or potential competitors are characterized by a permanent 
tension between cooperation and competition, residing not only within the alliance but, unlike 
with other types of alliance, also in the market (Gnyawali et al., 2006). This can increase 
partners’ motivation to maximize their own immediate, tangible benefits by behaving 
opportunistically rather than to maximize their potential (but uncertain) long-term, collective 
benefits by acting collaboratively (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Park and Ungson, 2001). For 
instance, if critical market information, such as prices for key accounts, is accidently revealed 
throughout a partnership, a direct rival can woo away customers to increase its own market 
share to the detriment of the partner. Also, if the collaboration facilitates one partner’s 
overcoming the knowledge barriers to market entry, that partner can go from being an indirect 
or potential rival to being a direct rival. Risks of knowledge appropriation are salient in R&D 
alliances (Larson, 1992; Park and Kim, 1997) and are even higher if competitors are involved: 
per definition, the partners typically meet similar market needs and/or have the required 
capabilities to do so (Peteraf and Bergen, 2003). Since they operate in similar fields and 
possess related market and/or technology knowledge, inter-partner learning tends to be higher 
than in other types of alliance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Dussauge et al., 2000).
4
 Given the 
high risks, alliances between competitors provide a conducive setting for the purpose of our 
study. Moreover, this study focuses on technology ventures as focal firms for two reasons. 
First, such firms intensively engage in R&D and often seek alliances to overcome resource 
constraints (Katila et al., 2008). Second, because they are particularly vulnerable to 
knowledge appropriation and strategic manipulation, effective safeguarding becomes a key 





Sample and procedure 
Our study is part of a larger survey on alliances of technology ventures with 
(potentially) competing incumbents (cf. Walter et al., 2010). Our sampling frame included 
technology ventures that run a business model based on a technological invention, collaborate 
with a potential, indirect, or direct competitor (Peteraf and Bergen, 2003), and are 
organizationally independent, headquartered in Germany and not older than ten years. In any 
given dyad, only the venture was surveyed because confidentiality agreements typically 
precluded their revealing the counterpart’s identity. Having no comprehensive list, we 
compiled our own initial list of about 2,750 firms from print media and the internet. In 
particular, we used keyword searches and browsed the websites of industry fairs, support 
programs, industry associations, science parks and research organizations. We called a one-
third quota of 883 randomly selected firms, of which 207 firms met our sampling criteria and 
agreed to participate. Trained interviewers then conducted face-to-face interviews with one 
informant at the upper management level, in particular a manager or founder who negotiated 
and structured the alliance. The interviewee was asked to report on the strategically most 
important alliance, irrespective of its success, that involved a potential, direct or indirect 
competitor and was old enough to evaluate its outcomes. Prior to the main interview, the 
interviewer double-checked that the alliance met the requirements of our survey. 
To mitigate the problem of a common method bias, we attempted to survey another 
informant at the operative level, in particular a project or alliance manager. The operative 
informant reported on strategic manipulation, knowledge appropriation and communication 
quality in an alliance named by the first informant. The managerial informant reported on the 
remaining constructs and variables. 118 of 207 firms participated in the second survey. Of 
these, 82 had alliances with an R&D focus and constitute our final sample.
5
 To test for non-
response bias, we compared respondents and non-respondents in terms of age, size, and 




response bias. The technology ventures were on average 3.46 years old (sd = 2.93), employed 
23.39 full-time equivalents (sd = 27.79), and were operating in the fields of biotechnology 
(25%), electronics (20%), nanotechnology/new materials (20%), software/simulation (11%), 
and others (25%). The partner firms were on average 24.49 years old (sd = 36.38) and larger 
in terms of sales (mean = 5.42, sd = 1.92) and employees (mean = 5.38, sd = 1.78), as 
reported by the respondents on 7-point Likert-scales (1 = “much smaller [than the focal 




The extant literature provides measures for general opportunistic behavior (e.g., Provan 
and Skinner, 1989; Luo, 2007b), but not for its more specific manifestation in strategic 
manipulation or knowledge appropriation. We therefore developed scales using a procedure 
proposed by Rossiter (2002). In particular, after an initial construct definition we involved 
expert raters to clarify whether a formative or reflective measurement model is more 
appropriate for a given construct and, if formative, whether the domain was captured 
completely. This procedure helps avoid the kind of misspecification that has plagued past 
studies (Jarvis et al., 2003). All scales were pre-tested in three successive rounds with two or 
three CEOs of technology ventures and revised up to the point where all pre-testers confirmed 
that the items were clear, meaningful, and relevant.  An overview of all scales and validity 
information is presented in the Appendix. 
Prior research has captured perceived opportunistic behavior in terms of both process 
and outcomes (e.g., Deeds and Hill, 1999; Luo, 2007b; Parkhe, 1993). Process measures 
indicate whether a focal firm has ‘caught a partner red-handed’ engaging in seemingly 
opportunistic activities, whereas outcome measures describe the results of such activities as 
observed by the focal firm ex-post.
6




operationalize strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation. First, initial observations 
of opportunistic activities can lead to further investigations possibly revealing more 
opportunistic activities. This suggests that the scope of opportunistic behavior may be more 
adequately evaluated from an ex-post perspective. Second, a firm’s response to opportunism 
may greatly depend on the impact of that opportunism (e.g., an erosion of the firm’s 
knowledge base) rather than on isolated observations of partner misconduct (e.g. of lying or 
obfuscating).  
 We used conceptual writings about alliance risks, alliance contracts, and exchange 
problems (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Barney and Hesterly, 2006) as basis for creating multi-
item scales of opportunistic behaviors. Strategic manipulation was measured with three 
reflective items capturing the degree to which a partner purposefully exerts a negative 
influence on the strategic decisions of the technology venture. The items were—like all the 
items in the following, unless stated otherwise—measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = 
”does not apply at all”; 7 = “applies fully and completely”). The measure is reliable at an 
alpha of 0.86. Knowledge appropriation was measured as the sum of four formative items 
similar to Norman (2004). The respondents stated to what extent they had ‘lost’ critical 
codified or tacit knowledge in the areas of marketing, technology, production, and 
management to the partner firm.
7
 To test the validity of our formative measure (an area of 
ongoing debate), we examined (1) content validity by asking expert judges, (2) nomological 
or criterion validity by investigating the correlation between the measure and a theoretically 
linked measure, and (3) discriminant validity by testing whether the constructs are less than 
perfectly correlated (MacKenzie et al., 2005; Rossiter, 2002).
8
 Both content and discriminant 
validity were confirmed. Knowledge appropriation were, as theoretically expected, positively 
related to a measure for closure by the partner firm (r = .35, p < .01; Hamel, 1991), which 





Independent and control variables 
To capture formalization, the respondents stated the degree to which written documents 
existed that spelled out detailed processes, roles, responsibilities, and tasks within the alliance. 
The four items are conceptually based on Lusch and Brown (1996) and are reliable at an alpha 
of 0.95. Communication quality was measured with five reflective items adapted from the 
extant literature (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Sin et al., 2005; Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). The 
scale is reliable at an alpha of 0.89. 
To isolate the effect of our predictor variables, we considered several critical control 
variables. Equity exchanges deal with whether at least one partner holds equity in the 
counterpart (1 = equity exchanges, 0 = otherwise). Opportunistic behavior is detrimental to 
the value of this investment and therefore discouraged (Gulati, 1995; Judge and Dooley, 
2006). Cooperation experience was operationalized as the number of years a manager 
(Informant 1) had worked with alliances. Such experience can help to effectively structure 
and coordinate such partnerships and thereby avoid the risks (and reap the benefits) of 
alliances (Sampson, 2005). Cooperation duration measures the number of months from the 
operative start until the end of the collaboration, as stated by the respondents. The risk of 
opportunism is believed to vary over time (Das, 2004).  
Incumbents with both the motivation and the ability to force the technology venture out 
of the market might behave more opportunistically. We therefore controlled for risk of 
opportunism, conceived of as the product of one item for the motivation (“It would have been 
very worthwhile for the partner to squeeze us out of the cooperation-related markets.”) and 
another item for the ability (“The partner had the potential to squeeze us out of the 
cooperation-related market.”). Learning intent deals with the possibility of a focal firm 
attempting to appropriate partner knowledge and thereby potentially initiating a learning race 
(Hamel, 1991). It was measured with three reflective items (α = .75). Finally, relational 




Sherwood and Covin, 2008). While prior research has distinguished goodwill and competence 
trust (e.g., Das and Teng, 2001), limited questionnaire space led us to use a three-item overall 
measure (α = .88). Goal congruence creates win-win situations between the parties and 
thereby discourages opportunistic behavior. Our three-item measure was adapted from Jap 
and Anderson (2003, α = .62).  
 
Endogeneity analysis 
Endogeneity bias has the potential to distort our results if governance not only affects 
opportunistic behavior but concerns about opportunistic behavior also affect governance. In 
other words, a technology venture could deploy more extensive safeguards in seemingly 
riskier alliances. Simultaneous causality might also exist in the relationship between 
communication quality and opportunistic behavior. In the case of endogeneity, independent 
variables and the error term are correlated. This violates the exogeneity assumption of 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimation and produces biased, inconsistent coefficients. 
According to Wooldridge (2003), two-stage instrumental variables regression can mitigate 
endogeneity bias, but it inflates standard errors and thus tends to be less efficient than OLS. It 
is therefore prudent not to empirically model a variable as endogenous until tests suggest that 
endogeneity is a statistical problem. We therefore conducted a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test on 
endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2003:121-122). In this test, all endogenous variables are first 
regressed on the other independent variables plus instruments, and then opportunistic 
behavior is regressed on the independent variables plus the fitted residuals from the first 
regressions. Statistical significance of the residuals indicates endogeneity bias.  
We started with selecting two instruments variables for formalization, namely 
information control (α = .73) and alliance importance (α = .81), and two instrument variables 
for communication quality, namely commitment (α = .85) and resource similarity (composite 




variables, but not with opportunistic behavior. First-stage regressions showed significant 
effects of the instruments on the respective endogenous variable. Further tests indicated that 
the instruments were exogenous (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 9.55, p < .01), relevant 
(Hansen J statistic < 1.17, ns) and non-redundant (X
2
 > 5.04, p < .10). Angrist-Pischke 
statistics of 4.80 for formalization and 10.71 for communication quality confirmed instrument 
strength for the latter and thus power of endogeneity tests (Doko Tchatoka and Dufour, 2013). 
Finally, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicated that formalization and communication quality 
did not create an endogeneity problem in the models for strategic manipulation (F = 1.99, p > 
.10) and knowledge appropriation (F = 1.97, p > .10), which was confirmed by additional C 




Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Table 2 reports the 
regression results. Following procedures suggested by Aiken and West (1991), coefficients 





Please insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that formalization increases opportunistic behavior perceived by 
the technology venture. Formalization was positively related to knowledge appropriation 
(Model 5: β = .66, p < .05). While the relationship with strategic manipulation was also 
positive, it was weakly significant in Model 2 (β = .22, p < .10), but significant for the 
conditional effect in Model 3 (β = .28, p < .05). Overall, the findings support Hypothesis 1. 




manipulation (Model 2: β = -.43, p < .01) and knowledge appropriation (Model 5: β = -.75, p 
< .05). Hypothesis 3 predicted interactive effects on opportunistic behavior between 
formalization and communication quality. Significant interactions were found for strategic 
manipulation (Model 3: β = -.38, p < .001), but not for knowledge appropriation (Model 6: β 
= .15, n.s.). To advance further interpretations, we plotted the interaction effect for low/high 
levels of the moderator, defined as minus/plus one standard deviation from the mean (Figure 
1). We also performed a simple slope analysis to test whether the slopes were different from 
zero (Aiken and West, 1991). The results confirmed the visual impression obtained from 
Figure 1. In other words, high communication quality mitigates the positive effect of 
formalization on strategic manipulation. Overall, Hypothesis 3 received partial support. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
According to a final set of hypotheses, the relationships suggested in Hypotheses 1 to 3 
depend on the type of opportunistic behavior. We used the seemingly unrelated estimation 
(SUEST) algorithm in Stata 11 to examine whether coefficients significantly differed across 
models. The results support Hypothesis 4a: formalization had a stronger positive relationship 
with knowledge appropriation than with strategic manipulation (Χ2 = 3.84, p < .05). However, 
both forms of opportunistic behavior did not differ regarding the effect of communication 
quality (Χ2 = 3.84, n.s.). Hypothesis 4b thus received no support. Hypothesis 4c suggested that 
the mitigating effect of communication quality on formalization is stronger for strategic 
manipulation than for knowledge appropriation. The interaction effect was significant for the 
prior (Model 3: β = -.38, p < .001) but not the latter (Model 6: β = .15, n.s.). Similarly, 
SUEST provided (weakly) significant findings that the interaction was more negative for 
strategic manipulation than for knowledge appropriation (Χ2 = 2.76, p < .10). Overall, we 





DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Among the many risks of alliances, opportunistic behavior is widely considered one of 
the most salient (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1985). Deploying effective 
safeguards is therefore critical to realizing value within alliances. Transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggest formalization as 
one preventive mechanism, but empirical research has yielded mixed findings on its efficacy 
in alliances (e.g., Deeds and Hill, 1999; Luo, 2007a). Thus, does formalization and, if so, 
when does formalization deter opportunistic behavior in R&D alliances? In our attempt to 
address these questions, this article started with distinguishing two forms of active 
opportunism, namely strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation. It then drew on the 
literature on coordination, cooperation, and sensemaking to posit that formalization promotes 
opportunistic behavior in R&D alliances, as perceived by a focal technology venture 
(Hypothesis 1). Communication quality has, as was further suggested, beneficial effects in 
that it directly mitigates perceived opportunistic behavior (Hypothesis 2) and reduces the 
dysfunctional effects of formalization (Hypothesis 3). The above effects are proposed to differ 
between knowledge appropriation and strategic manipulation (Hypotheses 4a-c).  
Our first key result is that extensive formalization seems to fuel the insidious problem 
of perceived opportunistic behavior in R&D alliances between competitors. This supports our 
arguments that formalization can enable or motivate a partner to actually behave more 
opportunistically, and/or it can lead the focal firm to perceive more opportunistic behavior, be 
it present or not. While this study hypothesized a linear effect of formalization, Vlaar et al. 
(2007b) proposed a curvilinear effect, namely that moderate rather than very low or very high 
levels of formalization are beneficial. Although additional analyses of our data could not 
confirm a u-shaped relationship between formalization and the two types of opportunistic 
behavior, both perspectives are not incommensurate.
10




formalization is often inevitable in R&D alliances and widely regarded beneficial. Only if 
exaggerated, formalization may have dysfunctional effects. Our sample of R&D alliances is, 
indeed, characterized by moderate to high levels of formalization (mean = 4.47, median = 
5.00). Thus, our finding of a positive linear effect could be viewed as a crude approximation 
of the right side of the u-shape suggested by Vlaar et al. (2007b).  
A second key result is that communication quality does not only directly reduce 
perceived opportunistic behavior, it also alleviates the positive impact of formalization on 
perceived strategic manipulation.
11
 While prior research has shown that communication 
generally facilitates alliance success by promoting the alignment of incentives (Agarwal et al., 
2010) and mutual support (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) between the parties, our study suggests 
that communication quality helps prevent perceptions of opportunism and mitigates the 
adverse effects of formalization such as breeding distrust or increasing the likelihood of 
misunderstandings. Moreover, the presence or absence of communication quality is one 
possible explanation for the ambiguity of prior findings, if the underlying samples 
systematically varied in partner communication behavior. 
A third key result is that the dysfunctional effect of formalization and the interactive 
effect of communication quality varied with the type of opportunism, which supports the call 
to further explore nuances of opportunism. However, we found no significant difference 
regarding communication quality. One possible explanation is the existence of a 
countervailing effect: strategic manipulation is overtly intentional, likely to be long-planned at 
the management level and severe. The offender accepts considerable risks of alliance 
termination and reputational damage and is thus likely to derive the main payoff from 
pursuing selfish, not collaborative goals. Since collaborative value creation is not the focus, 
strategic manipulation is relatively unaffected by communication quality. Finally and 
surprisingly, equity exchanges were positively related to knowledge appropriation. As one 




transferring and using company knowledge. Another explanation is that holding equity 
allowed participating in board meetings and therefore accelerated partner learning. 
 
Theoretical implications 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, prior research with roots in 
transaction costs economics and agency theory tended to view formalization as a solution to 
opportunism in interfirm exchanges (e.g., Luo, 2007b; Williamson, 1985). More recently, this 
view has been challenged as studies on buyer-supplier relationships associated opportunism 
with certain forms of monitoring and control (Heide et al., 2007; Ju et al., 2011; Provan and 
Skinner, 1989). Our study extends this line of research by demonstrating a positive 
formalization-opportunism relationship in the context of R&D alliances. The finding raises 
further doubts on the universal effectiveness of formalization to suppress opportunistic 
behavior.  
Second, our findings also add to the ongoing debate on formal and relational 
governance. Much research on relational governance has revolved around the notion of trust 
(e.g., Das and Teng, 1996, 1998, 2001; Lui and Ngo, 2004). While some scholars have 
viewed open communication as a facet of trust (e.g., Currall and Inkpen, 2002), our study 
proposes communication quality as a theoretically and empirically distinct concept that has an 
impact above and beyond trust. Moreover, some studies have found both formal and relational 
mechanisms to be complements (Faems et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), 
others find them to be substitutes (Carson, Madhok, and Wu, 200; Gulati, 1995). Our results 
suggest an alternative perspective: relational governance (communication quality) 
compensates for the dysfunctional effects of formal governance (formalization). Thus, 
formalization mechanisms derived from agency theory and transaction cost economics are not 






Third, although a more nuanced understanding of opportunism is warranted to find 
effective deterrents against opportunistic behavior, to date, only few scholars have responded 
to Wathe and Heide’s (2000) call (Das and Kumar, 2011; Jap et al., 2013; Lumineau and 
Quélin, 2012). This study conceptualized two distinct forms of opportunism salient in the 
context of R&D alliances, namely strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation. More 
importantly, our findings confirm that differentiating forms of opportunism matters: the 
dysfunctional effect of formalization was stronger for knowledge appropriation, whereas the 
interactive effect of communication quality was stronger for strategic manipulation. Our 
results point to a new challenge of matching, theoretically and empirically, safeguards and 
types of opportunism. This includes finding and categorizing further types of opportunism 
beyond the existing categorization of active-passive opportunism (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 




Why and when partners behave opportunistically is a key question for alliance 
managers, especially when they are entrusted with the development of R&D coopetitions. Our 
findings emphasize the need for judicious alliance governance because excessive efforts to 
control collaborative processes and partner behavior, thus tendencies to ‘over-formalize’, may 
spur opportunism. Since extensive contracts and work plans suppress, as we argue, intrinsic 
motivation and a climate of cooperation, competing partners should carefully examine the 
need to formalize before engaging in R&D alliances. Moreover, managers should 
communicate in an open and honest manner, in order to foster value creation in the alliance 
and reduce temptations to behave opportunistically. Although such communication may 
produce a positive atmosphere for interfirm decision-making and ultimately trust, 




communication while maintaining some ‘healthy distrust’ and that communication quality can 
be a first step towards interfirm trust. Our study also indicates that open and honest 
communication attenuates the adverse effects of formalization. Strategic manipulation in 
R&D alliances is lower when formal and relational governance are used together. This insight 
is important because a certain level of formalization is often inevitable to enable knowledge 
sharing processes that are critical for R&D alliance success.  
 
Limitations and future research 
The limitations of this study indicate promising potential approaches for future work. 
First, in using cross-sectional data, the study provides no insights into partnership dynamics. 
Future research could therefore adopt longitudinal designs to illuminate how opportunism 
emerges from the sequence of action and reaction by each partner. Second, the study focuses 
on ways of minimizing risks and costs, rather than on ways of creating value R&D alliances 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). Gaining a comprehensive understanding of value creation in such 
partnerships may require to incorporate both aspects—another interesting avenue for 
subsequent research. Third, we sample alliances between (potential) competitors in Germany 
in which one partner was a technology venture. Thus, our results are conditional and for the 
most part can be generalized just to this context. Still, we have no a priori reason to believe 
they would not generalize to other settings, in particular to alliances of non-competing 
partners. Fourth, while our study has focused on two facets of active opportunism, many other 
facets may exist and constitute exciting avenues for further research. Sixth, we cannot rule out 
that some respondents tended to report on more successful alliances. However, given that 
most firms had only one alliance with competitors that met our sampling criteria, the risk of 
such a selection bias distorting our results appears to be low. Seventh, we have relied on a 
simple formative measure of knowledge appropriation. Future research could further refine 




construct domain in other country contexts. Finally, we theorize on three possible 
mechanisms, namely that formalization increases the likelihood of (1) actual partner 
opportunism, (2) detecting partner opportunism, and (3) misperceiving actual partner 
opportunism. However, data limitations preclude, as it has in prior studies (e.g., Deeds and 
Hill, 1999; Luo, 2007a), empirically testing these explanations here. More research is 
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Descriptive statistics and correlations
a 
 







1. Strategic manipulation 1.76 1.15 - 
                   2. Knowledge appropriation 5.96 2.71 0.41 *** - 
                 3. Formalization 4.47 1.93 0.15 
 
0.20 t - 
               4. Communication quality 4.95 1.23 -0.51 *** -0.27 * 0.05 
 
- 









           6. Cooperation experience 10.96 11.60 0.06 
 





































0.25 * 0.11 
 




















 11. Goal congruence 6.24 0.78 -0.41 *** -0.24 * 0.05   0.44 *** 0.07   -0.22 * 0.03   0.08   0.20 t 0.20 t 
an = 82; Pearson product moment correlations are reported for pairs of continuous variables and Spearman rank correlations are reported for pairs of 
continuous and dichotomous variables. b Coding: 1 =  equity exchange, 0 = otherwise. 
*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 



















































                       
 












.64 * .30 
 
.59 * .29 
 
.59 * .29 
 
































































.49 t .29 
 
.48 t .29 
 














































Goal congruence -.42 ** .12 
 
-.28 * .12 
 
-.26 * .12 
 









                         Main effects 
                       
 
Formalization 
    
.22 t .12 
 
.28 * .11 
     
.66 * .30 
 
.63 * .30 
 
Communication quality 
    
-.43 ** .13 
 
-.52 *** .13 
     
-.75 * .34 
 
-.72 * .35 
                         Interaction effects 
                       
 
Formalization x communication quality 
        
-.38 *** .11 




                         
 














   
.36 
   
.45 
   
.16 
   
.26 
   
.26 
    adj. R2 .16      .28      .38      .08      .17      .16    
a n = 82; standardized coefficients. b Coding: 1 =  equity exchange, 0 = otherwise. 
*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 










   
Strategic manipulation (α = .86, CR = .86, AVE = .69; Informant 2)a   
(1) The partner has manipulated the strategic direction of our firm during the cooperation. .77 7.85 
(2) During the cooperation, the partner has hindered the further development of our firm.  .91 9.91 
(3) The partner has restrained our firm from reaching strategic goals through the 
cooperation. 
.81 8.59 
   
Knowledge appropriation (formative measure; Informant 2)b   
(1) We have lost critical marketing and sales know-how to the partner. - - 
(2) We have lost critical technological know-how to the partner. - - 
(3) We have lost critical production know-how to the partner. - - 
(4) We have lost critical management know-how to the partner. - - 
   
Formalization (α = .95, CR = .95, AVE = .82; Informant 1)   
(1) The processes of the cooperation were explicitly written down. .89 10.21 
(2) The roles of the partners in the cooperation were explicitly written down. .95 11.33 
(3) The responsibilities of the partners in the cooperation were explicitly written down. .90 10.33 
(4) The contributions of the partners to the cooperation were explicitly written down. .87 9.80 
   
Communication quality (α = .88, CR = .89, AVE = .61; Informant 2)   
(1) The partners can openly express their discontent towards each other. .75 7.61 
(2) The partners can communicate honestly. .79 8.33 
(3) The partners proactively provide timely and important information. .94 9.12 
(4) The partners share proprietary information. .65 6.31 
(5) The partners inform each other of changing project needs. .95 9.22 
   
Learning intent (α = .76, CR = .76, AVE = .52; Informant 1)   
(1) We have defined for our firm in advance which competences we want to develop in the 
partnership. 
.73 6.46 
(2) We have a clearly defined strategy to acquire knowledge in this partnership. .84 7.41 
(3) We systematically process the knowledge acquired in this partnership for a future use in 
our firm. 
.59 5.15 
   
Risk of opportunism (formative measure; Informant 1)a   
(1) It would have been very worthwhile for the partner to squeeze us out of the cooperation-
related markets. 
- - 
(2) The partner had the potential to squeeze us out of the cooperation-related market. - - 
   
Trust (α = .88, CR = .88, AVE = .72; Informant 1)   
(1) We cannot always entirely trust the partner. (r) .86 9.27 
(2) We are convinced that the partner will keep its promises. .79 8.24 
(3) We rely on the partner competently and professionally performing its tasks. .89 9.65 
   
Goal congruence (α = .62, CR = .88, AVE = .72; Informant 1)   
(1) The goals were supported by the management of both partners. .25 2.05 
(2) The goals suited the strategic direction of both partners. .70 6.06 
(3) The goals of the partners were highly compatible. .86 7.29 
   
α = Cronbach’s Alpha; CR = Composite reliability; AVE = Average variance extracted. a Informant 1: top  
manager or founder who negotiated the alliances; Informant 2: alliance or project manager who handled the 
partnership. b Conventional validity measures are irrelevant for formative scales. Model fit: χ2/df = 1.73; CFI = 





                                                 
1 In contrast to Vlaar et al. (2007a), enforcement is not included in our definition of formalization because start-
ups and also other firms often lack the resources to enforce their rights. Moreover, our study focuses on 
formalization as preventive measure, whereas the need to enforce suggests that misconduct has already taken 
place. 
2 According to transaction cost economics, not all actors act opportunistically all the time, but it is difficult and 
costly to distinguish opportunistic actors from non-opportunistic ones and therefore prudent to behave as if all 
actors were opportunistic (Foss and Koch, 1996; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab, 2008). Our understanding of 
opportunism is more in line with sociological research suggesting that opportunism varies among economic 
actors and across situations (Gulati et al., 2012). 
3 Structural responses to this uncertainty include, for instance, internalizing partner activities (Williamson, 1975), 
more extensive contracting (Luo, 2002), or contractual renegotiations (Reuer and Ariño, 2002). A lack of 
resources and experience, however, may keep many technology ventures from using these options in ongoing 
partnerships (Ariño et al., 2008). 
4 Not surprisingly, alliances between competitors are less frequent (Ang, 2008) and fail more often (Lhuillery 
and Pfister, 2009; Park and Russo, 1996) than other alliances. 
5 In 43% of the cases, a second informant was unavailable as the informant had left the firm or was lacking the 
time to participate. Some firms were too small to have a separate alliance manager. However, analyses indicated 
that cases with and without a second informant did not significantly vary in terms of age, size, and technological 
field. 
6 One example for a process item is: “Sometimes my partner alters the facts in order to get what they need” 
(Deeds and Hill, 1999:163) and for an outcome item: “[M]y partner has sometimes promised to do things 
without actually doing them later” (Parkhe, 1993:828). 
7 The term ‘lost’ is colloquial and emphasizes that a knowledge flow (1) is unintended by the focal firm, (2) is 
not compensated by the profiting party, and (3) reduces the exclusivity and thus the value of this knowledge. 
However, strictly speaking, such flows do not decrease the firm’s knowledge stock. 
8 Because formative indicators are not necessarily intercorrelated, reliability in terms of internal consistency and 
convergent validity are irrelevant in this case (Jarvis et al., 2003). 
9 The maximum variance inflation factors (VIF) were 1.56 for standardized data, 6.60 for raw data excluding the 
interaction term and 28.53 for raw data including the interaction term, whereas the maximum condition indices 
were 2.18, 34.33 and 65.57, respectively. However, Echambadi and Hess (2007) warn against false alarms from 
collinearity diagnostics, for instance because high VIFs are necessary but not sufficient to collinearity. Following 
their recommendation, we reran our estimations for five randomly selected subsets of the data. The coefficients 
were stable across the subsets and plausible, revealing no serious problems of multicollinearity.  
10 The results are available from the first author. 
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to another possibility: Since initial formal governance 
structures influence communication patterns between individuals from both partners (Faems et al., 2008; Vlaar et 
al., 2007a), communication quality could mediate the relationship between formalization and opportunistic 
behavior. However, our data does not support this notion, thereby providing further support for a moderating 
relationship.  
